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EU Carbon Tariffs Are Coming, Making It Difficult For China's Auto Exports

Nov 18, 2022

The EU's carbon tariff is an overt conspiracy to curb China's manufacturing cost advantage. Chinese car companies, including full-chain suppliers, must do a good job in their own zero-carbon transformation, focusing on improving carbon efficiency and carbon competitiveness.

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The "2035 Policy on Banning the Sale of Fuel Vehicles" (hereinafter referred to as "2035 Policy") just passed by the European Union is considered to be an integral part of "Fit for 55" (reducing carbon emissions by 55% in 2030 compared to 1990).

The other part is the CBAM (EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or carbon tariff) passed on June 22.

The essence of carbon tariffs

Unlike the previously speculated launch in 2025, CBAM will only be implemented in a limited manner in 2027. This is obviously related to the current energy situation facing the EU.

The auto export business is expected to see a "range attack" from CBAM in 2030. And this year should be a year when China's new energy automobile industry is moving towards scale improvement, and its ability to radiate externally will also be raised to a new level. Isn't it a coincidence?

On the surface, CBAM was introduced as a patch to the EU-ETS (European Emissions Trading System, launched in 2003) to prevent "carbon leakage". But really, CBAM might be the main course. An objective function of carbon tariffs is a means to adjust national competitiveness.

Of course, "Fit for 55" is more than these two tricks, and other components will come one after another. With regard to these two tricks, its content will continue to be enriched and its essence strengthened. The EU hopes to turn "carbon" into a shield to resist the all-round industrial impact of low-cost countries. That's right, it is aimed at emerging industrial countries led by China.

When the European Parliament adopted CBAM, it also emphasized that the system "shall not be abused by trade protectionism", but they have also been calling for corresponding policies to protect European local industries. It should be said that these two demands themselves run counter to each other.

When it comes to actual implementation, even CBAM itself, as a patch, is probably patch upon patch. Because the interests involved are too wide, opponents outside the region will also launch counterattacks.

The above involves a lot of concepts, and these concepts are very rich in content, and each is supported by a large set of rules behind it. In fact, even the enterprises in the EU have not fully understood these rules that have not yet been formally implemented.

China and other developing countries (actually covering the vast majority of export-oriented countries that value the EU market) are organizing people to interpret the CBAM system. In other words, it is a national project to comprehensively and deeply understand and make appropriate responses.

Here, we want to make some omissions, and just want to make some predictions on the direction of CBAM's impact on China-EU auto trade.

The Calculus of Carbon Tariffs

The EU-ETS implemented in 2005 aims to impose carbon tax on enterprises in the EU.

The general principle is the total amount control and distribution mechanism. A certain free quota is given to heavy industry, which is very similar to our country's practice. But the difference is that its monitoring, reporting, and verification systems are more stringent, leading to high energy consumption and high carbon emission enterprises cannot escape the fate of obediently paying carbon tax. European metallurgical and chemical companies were expropriated in the first wave.

In practice, in 2012, the European Union began to impose a carbon tax on foreign airlines entering EU airports, which triggered boycotts and protests from more than 20 countries including China, the United States, Russia, and India. The EU was forced to "conditionally suspend", which lasted for 10 years and has not yet restarted.

This made the EU realize that EU-ETS will only raise the cost of its own enterprises, forcing the latter to be expelled from the EU, build factories outside the region, and then sell their products back to the EU. This is "carbon leakage".

Of course, other countries that do not have a carbon tax burden, sell their products into the EU, which is also considered "carbon leakage". China is the EU's largest trading partner, and the EU has to make careful calculations.

In 2018, 30 million tons of carbon emissions were embedded in the products sold by the EU to China; 270 million tons of carbon emissions were embedded in the products sold by China to the EU in the same period. Therefore, from the perspective of the EU, CBAM is used to erase the unfair competitive advantages obtained by enterprises from countries outside the region such as China.

As usual, the first unlucky ones are high-emission enterprises, including steel, cement, electricity, chemical fertilizers, cement, etc. BASF has invested in a large production line in Zhanjiang City, Guangdong Province. If the market is locked in Europe, it will also be within the scope of this wave of adjustments. Because the new mechanism includes plastics, hydrogen/ammonia, and organic chemical products.

These are simple products, that is, primary industrial products, so what about complex products like cars?

The carbon emission in the production of automobiles is the sum of the "implicit emissions" of simple products consumed. How to calculate the "implied emissions" has not yet been announced, and the EU seems to have not made up its mind. For China's electric vehicle industry, which has just gained a cost advantage, according to unfavorable expectations, it is always right.

In fact, China exports very little electricity, steel, cement, and chemical fertilizers to the EU (mainly Russia exports to the EU). The annual export of these products to Europe is only 7 billion U.S. dollars, accounting for 1.3% of China's total exports to the EU in 2021.

As we just mentioned, in the past two years, the investment of European enterprises in Chinese organic chemicals has increased rapidly. If plastics, hydrogen/ammonia and organic chemicals are all included in the carbon tax basket, the involved exports will increase to more than US$40 billion, accounting for 7.4% of China's exports to the EU in 2021. This is worth taking seriously.

What if electromechanical and automotive products are also included? We have to look at it from a dynamic perspective. By 2030, when carbon taxes are imposed on these complex industrial products, the impact on China's exports to the EU will reach 40%.

How much does the car carbon tax have to pay?

So, how much will the carbon tariffs on auto exports increase? In the production process, if no carbon reduction measures are used, the carbon emissions of electric vehicles are higher than those of fuel vehicles. The main difference lies in the battery pack.

We know that the taxation standards for aluminum, steel and plastic are 27%, 21% and 8.7%. Cars use the above metal and non-metal raw materials, and the use of alkaline metals and rare earth metals in new energy is much higher than that of fuel vehicles, so the comprehensive carbon tax rate may be around 15%.

Assuming a Chinese electric car with a CIF price of 50,000 euros, the carbon tariff alone will cost 7,500 euros, which is just about the same as the subsidies given to new energy vehicles by most EU countries. One positive and the other negative, it means that Chinese electric vehicles will bear about 15,000 euros more "policy costs" than EU local products.

This is not easy to win, and the cost-sensitive mid-to-low-end electric vehicles are even more out of the question.

Now some companies are more optimistic. Envision AESC executives have publicly calculated that for a 100 kWh battery pack (the domestic ex-factory price is 150,000-200,000 yuan, depending on the battery solution), the export carbon tax burden to Europe is about 3,500 yuan.

So calculated, the carbon tax is less than 3%. This may be due to the fact that companies try their best to apply carbon reduction solutions in production, thus greatly reducing carbon tariffs.

"Autobot" believes that there may be some misunderstandings.

The EU will not recognize China's green certificate (electronic certificate for non-hydro renewable energy power generation) and CCER (voluntary emission reduction verification volume), and naturally will not exempt low-carbon production enterprises (including those keen to use carbon-free electricity in the final assembly process) car companies).

Before the Paris Agreement in 2016, the EU believed that there was double counting of CCER (the specific reasons were not expanded), and the EU successfully included the EU-ETS rules into the Paris Agreement accordingly. However, the "common but differentiated responsibilities" advocated by China stays at the level of moral appeal and has not been implemented in the generally recognized calculation of carbon emissions.

Photovoltaic modules from China are considered "zero-carbon imports" by default. The reason is that the transformation of energy production in the EU requires Chinese photovoltaic products (the EU's own photovoltaic industry has been beaten).

However, lithium batteries will be included in the scope of CBAM with a high probability, because the EU is spending a lot of money to build a lithium battery industry (although it relies heavily on Asian suppliers), but the cost is higher than that of imported power batteries. The EU has a strong incentive to raise the cost of imported batteries with CBAM.

China has also established a carbon market to some extent. However, the CBAM Act claims that the (EU) importer can declare that the product has already borne the cost of carbon emissions in the exporting country (China), so it can offset the corresponding degree and quantity of carbon tariff obligations.

To sum it up, Chinese products that carry carbon emissions can only be deducted for the amount (the actual carbon tax paid by the company, the funds paid for the purchase of carbon emission rights), not the carbon quota. To simplify it again, money can only be used for money, and other policy tools cannot be used.

The EU believes that China has a lot of free quotas, which leads to the low price of carbon emission trading. If the rules are mutually recognized, the EU will definitely suffer, and the result will be a policy fight between the two sides. For example, companies like Tesla and BYD sell new energy credits in China every year and still make money. If they export to the EU, they only have to pay for it.

In fact, no matter how advanced a car company claims its carbon reduction technology is, even if it is the world's number one, it cannot be exempted. Unless China's carbon emission policy is more radical than that of the EU, the EU can consider exemptions.

expensive to make

In this way, the EU's CBAM has become an open conspiracy to curb China's manufacturing cost advantage. If you don’t follow (meaning you don’t want to be as harsh as the EU), then companies will have to pay for their exports; if you follow, it means that you follow the EU rules, so China’s carbon claims are actually suspended.

Now, all countries are stepping up their efforts to study and judge the carbon tax policy to be implemented in Europe and the United States. The "Clean Competition Act" in the United States may be the first to "go online". Unlike Europe's "universal levy" strategy, the United States adopts an incremental levy approach (that is, companies that exceed the average carbon emission level need to pay carbon tax).

Moreover, the targets of the U.S. carbon tax rules include domestic and foreign producers, unlike Europe that has two sets of rules (EU-ETS and CBAM).

What they have in common is that they all start with simple industrial products with high energy consumption and high carbon emissions.

This is why many countries around the world, including the Middle East, Latin America, and even African countries, are beginning to vigorously develop new energy sources (mainly photovoltaic and wind energy). Even Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have no energy shortage at all, are using Chinese companies as general contractors to develop super-large photovoltaic projects.

The reason is that everyone can see that the ratio of primary energy must be changed (that is, the proportion of renewable energy must be increased), so as to reduce costs in trade.

In essence, CBAM and the "2035 Policy" have the same idea, which is to use morality and political correctness to suppress China's industrialization process, and even force China and emerging countries to "de-industrialize." Unexpectedly, a Russia-Ukraine war was going on, and the most intense de-industrialization was the EU countries.

China's automobile electrification is the process with the furthest technology, the largest scale and the most positive market feedback in the world today. China does not have any "2035 policy". Instead, Europeans who can't handle batteries are shouting at carbon emissions and fuel vehicles. This kind of magical situation is not simple hypocrisy, but a means of competition in the "obscene stream".

China does not support the establishment of CBAM by the EU, but in view of the current stage of social development in China, it is doomed not to adopt desperate measures to reduce carbon emissions. However, the specific implementation path for China's "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality" goals is clear and feasible.

In Europe, no matter the "2035 Policy" or CBAM, they are loudly shouted, but the implementation is full of difficulties, internal interests are not balanced, and there is a lack of countermeasures against the outside world.

Chinese car companies, including full-chain suppliers, must do a good job in their own zero-carbon transformation, focusing on improving carbon efficiency and carbon competitiveness. The standard is simple, strive to contain as little carbon emissions as possible in the product. But this requires digging into every link in the value chain, not only for ourselves, but also for suppliers to put forward a package of carbon reduction requirements.

It's hard to do, but we see some companies doing it. Most of them are joint ventures, which shows that multinational car companies are more familiar with EU carbon tariffs than Chinese brands.

In this way, even if the policy is unfavorable for a while, the loss is controllable. What's more, China's carbon counterattack is inevitable. This is actually a smaller version of the trade war.

Like photovoltaics, the EU's achievement of climate goals will inevitably increase demand for China's new energy vehicles. When the carbon efficiency of Chinese products is better, the containment effect of CBAM is not so great.

Now the EU still thinks about it, because it feels that it can still fight for new energy vehicles. When it gets mixed up with photovoltaics, it will also lie flat.


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